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Abstract: We propose an integral Nash equilibrium seeking control (I-NESC) law which steers
the multi-agent system composed of a special class of linear agents to the neighborhood of the
Nash equilibrium in noncooperative strongly monotone games. First, we prove that there exist
parameters of the integral controller such that the system converges to the Nash equilibrium
in the full-information case, in other words, without the parameter estimation scheme used
in extremum seeking algorithms. Then we prove that there exist parameters of the I-NESC
such that the system converges to the neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium in the limited
information case where parameter estimation is used. We provide a simulation example that
demonstrates that smaller perturbation frequencies and amplitudes are needed to attain similar
convergence speed as the existing state-of-the-art algorithm.
Keywords: Nash equilibrium seeking, Extremum seeking, Multi-agent systems
1. INTRODUCTION
Extremum seeking control is a class of data-driven, adap-
tive control techniques used in optimization problems
where the cost is a function of the states of a dynamical
system. The method is a zero-order method which means
it only uses the value of the cost function for optimization
and no a priori knowledge of the cost function is needed,
except for some basic assumptions.
The method was first proposed in [Leblanc [1922]]. For
many years there was no analytical proof of stability of
extremum seeking control for general nonlinear systems
until the paper [Krstic´ and Wang [2000]]. This sparked
renewed interest into further development of this type of
control. Most of the research was based on the original
paper by Krstic´ and Wang, e.g. [Tan et al. [2006]], [Ghaffari
et al. [2012]], etc. There were also methods based on dif-
ferent ideas, such as [Du¨rr et al. [2013]], where the authors
proposed an extremum seeking scheme based on Lie alge-
bra, which turned out to be equivalent to the Krstic´-Wang
scheme. Based on the parameter estimation scheme from
[Adetola and Guay [2007]], Guay and Dochain propose
an extremum seeking scheme [Guay and Dochain [2017a]]
which does not use singular perturbation and averaging
theory. As a result, a faster convergence rate is obtained.
This fact motivates further research on such type of ex-
tremum seeking controller.
Although very similar at a first glance, Nash equilibrium
problems (NEP) are different from standard (distributed)
optimization problems, as they are characterized by a
number of selfish agents whose goal is to optimize their
individual cost functions, each possibly dependent on the
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decision variables of other agents. In NEPs, the constraints
on the decision set of each agent are independent of
other agents, while in the generalized Nash equilibrium
problems (GNEP), they share constraints. Recent interest
in GNEPs is justified by the fact that many engineering
problems, such as demand-side management in the smart
grids [Saad et al. [2012]], charging/discharging of electric
vehicles [Grammatico [2017]] and formation control [Lin
et al. [2014]], can be modelled as GNEPs.
The literature on NEPs and GNEPs mostly ignores the
dynamics of individual agents, which may be problem in
real-world multi-agent systems with non-negligible dynam-
ics. The small portion of literature on NEPs and GNEPs
with dynamical agents can be divided into two groups:
algorithms that use the passivity properties of first-order
methods and algorithms that use extremum seeking as a
zero-order method.
By using the passivity property in [Gadjov and Pavel
[2018]], the authors design a control law that guarantees
convergence to the Nash equilibrium of a multi-agent
system with single-integrator dynamics over a network.
In [Romano and Pavel [2019]], the authors extend the
result to the multi-integrator case. The network topology
was considered to be non-time-varying in both cases.
As a result, certain assumptions have to be met by the
network graph. In [De Persis and Grammatico [2019]], the
authors extend the results of [Gadjov and Pavel [2018]] by
designing a network weight adaptation scheme. In [Bianchi
and Grammatico [2019]], a controller was proposed which
guarantees convergence to a generalized Nash equilibrium
of a multi-agent system with single and double integrator
dynamics over a network.
Most prominently, extremum seeking was used for Nash
equilibrium seeking in [Frihauf et al. [2011]] where it
was proven that the extremum seeking control, under
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certain conditions on the individual cost functions, will
converge to the neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium for
general nonlinear agents. In [Liu and Krstic´ [2011]], it
is proven that the use of stochastic perturbation signals
also admits the convergence to the neighborhood of the
Nash equilibrium. The authors in [Poveda and Teel [2017]]
propose a framework for synthesis of a hybrid controller
which could also be used for NEPs with nonlinear agents.
All of the mentioned extremum seeking controllers are
based on [Krstic´ and Wang [2000]].
Contribution Motivated by the recent research interest
in NEPs, we adapt the extremum seeking controller pro-
posed in [Guay and Dochain [2017a]], [Guay et al. [2018]].
Specifically, our contributions are the following:
• We extend a known proportional-integral extremum
seeking control scheme to strongly monotone NEPs
for a multi-agent linear systems and we prove a
practical convergence to a Nash equilibrium.
• We numerically observe an improved performance
with respect to [Frihauf et al. [2011]], as smaller
amplitudes and frequencies of the sinusoidal pertur-
bations signals are needed for a comparable rate of
convergence.
Notation R denotes the set of real numbers. For a
matrix A ∈ Rn×m, A> and ‖A‖ denote its trans-
pose and maximum singular value respectively. For vec-
tors x, y ∈ Rn, x>y and ‖x‖ denote the Euclidean
inner product and norm, respectively. Given N vec-
tors x1, . . . , xN , possibly of different dimensions, x :=[
x>1 , . . . , x
>
N
]>
and for each i = 1, . . . , N , x−i :=[
x>1 , . . . , x
>
i−1, x
>
i+1, . . . , x
>
N
]>
. diag (A1, . . . , AN ) denotes
the block diagonal matrix with A1, . . . , AN on its diag-
onal. For a function v : Rn × Rm → R differentiable in
the first argument, we denote the partial gradient vector
as ∇xv(x, y) :=
[
∂v(x,y)
∂x1
>
, . . . , ∂v(x,y)∂xN
>]> ∈ Rn. For a
maping v : Rn → Rm, we denote the set of zeros as
zer(V ) := {x ∈ dom(A)|0m ∈ V (x)}.
2. PROBLEM SETUP
We consider a multi-agent system with N agents indexed
by I = {1, 2, . . . , N}, each with the following dynamics:
x˙i = −xi +Biui (1a)
yi = hi(xi,x−i), (1b)
where xi ∈ Rni is the state vector, ui ∈ Rmi is the control
input, yi ∈ R is the output variable which evaluates the
cost function hi : Rni × Rn−i → R. Let us also define
n :=
∑
ni, n−i :=
∑
j 6=i nj and m :=
∑
mi.
Standing Assumption 1 (Regularity)
For each i ∈ I, the function hi in (1b) is differentiable in
xi and its partial gradient ∇xihi is Lipschitz continuous
in xi and x−i. 2
A common assumption amongst the extremum seeking
literature (for example [Krstic´ and Wang [2000]], [Guay
and Dochain [2017a]], [Poveda and Teel [2017]]) is the
existence of the steady-state mapping, which tells us to
which state(s) the system converges when a constant input
is applied. For our subsystems (1a), for each i ∈ I, there
exists a mapping
pi(u) :=
 pi1(u1)...
piN (uN )
 =
 B1u1...
BNuN
 (2)
such that for every i ∈ I,
pii(ui) = Biui. (3)
Let us also define
pi−i(u−i) :=

pi1(u1)
...
pii−1(ui−1)
pii+1(ui+1)
...
piN (uN )

. (4)
In this paper, we assume that the goal of each agent is to
minimize its own steady-state cost function, i.e.,
min
ui∈Rmi
hi (pii(ui), pi−i(u−i)) , (5)
which depends on the inputs of some other agents as
well. From a game-theoretic perspective, we consider the
problem to compute a Nash equilibrium (NE).
Definition 1. (Nash equilibrium). A collective input u∗ is
a NE of the game (5) if for all i ∈ I
hi
(
pii(u
∗
i ), pi−i(u
∗
−i)
) ≤ inf
ui∈Rni
hi
(
pii(ui), pi−i(u∗−i)
)
. 2
In plain words, a set of inputs is a NE if no agent
can improve its steady-state cost function by unilaterally
changing its input.
Since for all i ∈ I, the steady-state cost functions are dif-
ferentiable in ui, it follows from Theorem 16.3 in [Bauschke
et al. [2011]] that a collective vector u∗ is a NE if and only
if
∇uihi
(
pii(u
∗
i ), pi−i(u
∗
−i)
)
= 0. (6)
In view of (6), we can stack all of the partial gradients
into a single vector and form the so-called pseudo-gradient
mapping of the steady-state cost functions:
F (u) :=
 ∇u1h1 (pi1(u1), pi−i(u−1))...
∇uNhN (piN (uN ), pi−N (u−N ))
 . (7)
Therefore, by (6) and (7), we note that the problem of
finding a Nash equilibrium of the game in (5) is equivalent
to finding u∗ such that F (u∗) = 0, which is the problem
of finding a zero of F in (7), u∗ ∈ zer(F ).
A relatively standard assumption in modern game theory
literature [Yu et al. [2017]], [Yi and Pavel [2019]] is strong
monotonicity of the pseudo-gradient:
Standing Assumption 2 (Strong monotonicity)
The mapping F in (7) is strongly monotone, i.e.,
(F (u)− F (v))>(u− v) ≥ µ‖u− v‖2, (8)
for all (u,v) ∈ R2m, for some µ > 0.
Let us also define the pseudo-gradient with respect to x of
the cost functions
Fx(x) :=
 ∇x1h1 (x1,x−1)...
∇xNhN (xN ,x−N )
 . (9)
We note that, in general, monotonicity of the pseudo-
gradient of the cost function Fx(x) does not imply mono-
tonicity of the pseudo-gradient of the steady-state cost
function F (u).
3. INTEGRAL NASH EQUILIBRIUM SEEKING
CONTROL
In this section, we propose two control schemes for Nash
equilibrium seeking. The first one is designed for the
full-information case. In other words, agents have perfect
information of the actions of other agents and some
additional information which will be described in more
detail in the next subsection. The second is data-driven,
i.e. designed for the case when the agents have access to
the cost output.
3.1 Full-information case
In the simplest case, we assume that every agent knows
the analytic expression of its partial gradient and has
access to the inputs of the other agents. The integral Nash
equilibrium control in the next subsection will approxi-
mate the gradient and inputs of the other players and
use the approximations in the same control law as the
full-information case. Our proposed control law is inspired
by the extremum seeking control in [Guay and Dochain
[2017a]], [Guay et al. [2018]]:
∀i ∈ I : u˙i = − 1
τi
B>i ∇xihi(xi,x−i) (10)
or in collective vector form
u˙ = −τ−1B>Fx(x), (11)
where B := diag(B1, . . . , BN ) and τ := diag(τ1, . . . , τN ).
Unlike [Guay and Dochain [2017a]], we do not use the
proportional part, as it does not help with the convergence
to the Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 1. (Convergence to Nash equilibrium). Consider
the multi-agent system with dynamics (1a) and control law
in (10)-(11) and let (x(t),u(t)) be its closed-loop solution.
Let the Standing Assumptions hold. Then, there exists
τ∗ such that if mini∈I τi ≥ τ∗, then the pair (x(t),u(t))
converges to (x∗,u∗) = (pi(u∗),u∗), where u∗ is a Nash
equilibrium of the game in (5). 2
Proof. See Appendix A. 
3.2 Limited information case
In the limited information case, we consider that the
agents have access to the cost output. We emphasize that
they neither know the actions of other agents, nor they
know the analytic expressions of their partial gradients.
This is the standard setup used in extremum seeking
([Krstic´ and Wang [2000]], [Guay and Dochain [2017a]],
[Poveda and Teel [2017]] among others).
The extremum seeking control proposed by [Guay and
Dochain [2017a]] assumes that the cost function of the
system has a strong relative degree of value one. This
means that the first derivative of the cost function has
a direct influence on the input to the system. In the case
of multi-agent systems, where the cost functions do not
depend only on the states of their agent but also of the
others, we make an analogous assumption:
Assumption 1 (Degree of the output)
For every i ∈ I, ∇xihi(xi,x−i)>Bi 6= 0 for all (xi,x−i) ∈
Rn \ {x∗}. 2
Let us first evaluate the derivative of the cost functions:
y˙i = −
N∑
j=1
∇xjhi(x)> +
N∑
j 6=i
∇xjhi(x)>Bjuj
+∇xihi(x)>Biui, (12)
and introduce the following variables:
θ0i := −
N∑
j=1
∇xjhi(x)> +
N∑
j 6=i
∇xjhi(x)>Bjuj , (13)
θ1i := ∇xihi(x)>Bi. (14)
The variable θ0i measures the effect of the autonomous
dynamics of agent i on its cost function and the effects
of inputs of the other agents. The variable θ1i measures
the effect of the input of agent i on the cost output yi. By
substituting the previous variable definitions into (12), the
derivative of the cost output reads as
y˙i = θ
0
i + θ
1
i ui = [1, u
>
i ]θi, (15)
where θi = [θ
0
i , θ
1>
i ]. Note that θ
1
i is proportional to the
right-hand side in (10). To estimate the local θ0i and θ
1
i , we
use a time-varying parameter estimation approach such as
the one proposed in [Guay and Dochain [2017b]]. Let us
provide a basic intuition.
Let yˆi and θˆi be estimations of the output yi and the
variable θi respectively and let ei = yi − yˆi be the
estimation error. Then, the estimator model of (15) for
agent i is given by
˙ˆyi = [1, u
>
i ]θˆi +Kiei + c
>
i
˙ˆ
θi, (16)
where Ki is a free design parameter. Note that the first two
terms on the right-hand side resemble high gain observer
schemes. As the structure of the problem does not allow
the use of high gain observers, it is necessary to introduce
some other dynamics into the estimation. This is the
primary role of the third term in (16). Therefore, the
dynamics of ci(t) are choosen as
c˙>i = −Kic>i + [1, u>i ]. (17)
Let us also introduce an auxiliary variable ηi, with dynam-
ics η˙i = −Kiηi − c>i θ˙, and its estimate ηˆi, with dynamics
˙ˆηi = −Kiηˆi. (18)
The original parameter estimation law in [Adetola and
Guay [2008]] was designed for constant parameters, there-
fore ηi = ηˆi and was fully known. For time-varying pa-
rameters, we still want to use ηi, but the additional term
−c>i θ˙ does not allow for its calculation, since the rate of
change of the parameters is unknown. This is why the
estimate ηˆi is used in the parameter estimation law. It
is also necessary to define a symmetric, positive definite
scaling matrix variable Σi ∈ Rmi+1×mi+1 with dynamics
given by
Σ˙i = cic
>
i − kTi Σi + σiI Σi(0) = α1i , (19)
where k>i , σi and α
i
1 are free design parameters. We
note that, originally, in [Adetola and Guay [2008]], Σ˙i =
cic
>
i , but this proved to be inconvenient in practical
implementations, as the elements of Σi grow unbounded.
Instead, as in (19), dynamics of Σi behave as a first-order
system. The third term is added so that the matrix is
always invertible.
Equations (16)-(19) form the parameter update law pre-
sented in [Adetola and Guay [2008]]:
˙ˆ
θi = ΠΘi
(
θˆi,Σ
−1
i (ci(ei − ηˆi)− σiθˆi)
)
, (20)
where ΠΘi(θˆ, v) denotes the projection of the vector v onto
the tangent cone of the set Θi at θˆ, as defined by Equation
2.14 in [Nagurney and Zhang [2012]]. This implies that if
the starting value θˆi(0) is in Θi, so will θˆi(t) for all t.
We are finally ready to propose an integral decentralized
Nash equilibrium seeking control law of the form
∀i ∈ I :
{
ui = uˆi + di(t)
˙ˆui = − 1
τi
θˆ1i
(21)
together with Equations (16)–(20). In the collective vector
form, Equation (21) read as{
u = uˆ+ d(t)
˙ˆu = −τ−1θˆ1 (22)
As in [Guay and Dochain [2017a]], for the parameter
estimation scheme to converge, a persistency of excitation
(PE) assumption for every agent is introduced.
Assumption 2 (Persistence of excitation)
For every i ∈ I, there exist constants α2i and Ti such that∫ t+Ti
t
ci(τ)ci(τ)
>dτ ≥ α2i I, ∀t > 0, (23)
where ci(τ) is the solution to (17). 2
We conclude the section with the main theoretical result
of the paper, namely, the convergence of the closed-loop
dynamics to a Nash equilibrium of the game.
Theorem 2. (Convergence to Nash equilibrium). Consider
a multi-agent system with dynamics (1a) and control law
(16) – (20), (21), for all i ∈ I and let (x(t),u(t)) be
its closed-loop solution. Let the Standing Assumptions
and Assumptions 1, 2 hold, let pi be the steady-state
mapping in (2) and let D be the largest amplitude of
the perturbation signals {di(t)}i∈I . Then, there exist
gains (Ki, k
T
i , σi)i∈I and τ
∗ such that if mini∈I τi ≥ τ∗,
then the pair (x(t),u(t)) converges towards the O(D2)
neighborhood of some (x∗,u∗) = (pi(u∗),u∗), where u∗ is
a Nash equilibrium of the game in (5). 2
Proof. See Appendix B. 
4. SIMULATION EXAMPLE
Consider a system with three agents i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, having
dynamics:
x˙i = −xi + ui. (24)
The cost functions of agents are given by
Fig. 1. State trajectories of the three agents under I-NESC
(solod blue) and [Frihauf et al. [2011]] (doted red)
Fig. 2. Input of the first agent under I-NESC (solid blue)
and [Frihauf et al. [2011]] (doted red)
y1 = 1.5(x1 − 1)2 + 1.5x1x2 + x1x3
y2 = −2x2x1 + 1.5(x2 − 2)2 + x2x3
y3 = −2.5x3x1 − x3x2 + 1.5(x3 − 3)2. (25)
Two types of controllers were simulated to have a
comparison; the limited information controller proposed
by this paper and the controller proposed in [Frihauf
et al. [2011]] with additional low-pass and high-pass filters
as in [Krstic´ and Wang [2000]] in order to improve the
performance. The latter can be described by the following
equations
η˙i = −ωihηi + ωihyi,
ξ˙i = −ωilξi + ωil(yi − ηi)Ai sin(ωit),
˙ˆui = −kiAiξi,
ui = uˆi +Ai sin(ωit). (26)
For our controller, the following parameters were chosen:
σ1 = σ2 = σ3 = 10
−6, K1 = K2 = K3 = 50,
k1T = k
2
T = k
3
T = 50, α
1
I = α
2
I = α
3
I = 0.1, τ1 = 5,
τ2I = 10, τ
3
I = 15, d1(t) =
1
2 sin (40t), d2(t) =
1
2 sin (50t)
and d3(t) =
1
2 sin (60t). Initial states of x, uˆ, c, θ and
η were set to zero. The parameters K, kT and τI were
initially chosen large enough to ensure stability. Then
τI was decreased to speed up the convergence. Further
decreases in τI were making the states oscillate; further
decreasing of K and kT did not improve the performance
of the algorithm.
For the Frihauf et al., the following parameters were
chosen: ω1h = 180, ω
2
h = 200, ω
3
h = 220, ω
1
l = 45,
ω2l = 50, ω
3
l = 55, ω1 = 90, ω2 = 100, ω3 = 110,
k1 = k2 = k3 = 0.5 and A1 = A2 = A3 = 5. The
parameters were experimentally chosen in such a way that
a fast convergence rate is obtained without increasing the
amplitude of the sinusoidal perturbations to unreasonable
values.
The results of the numerical simulations can be seen in
Figures 1 and 2. While the convergence speed of both
algorithms is similar, the frequency and amplitude of the
sinusoidal perturbation signals are much lower with our
I-NESC law.
We remark that the proportional-integral extremum seek-
ing control in [Guay and Dochain [2017a]] is capable
of achieving a faster convergence speed than the algo-
rithm in [Krstic´ and Wang [2000]]. Our I-NESC algorithm
has slower convergence compared to [Guay and Dochain
[2017a]] because of the lack of the proportional part in
the control law. Although for optimization problems it can
greatly improve convergence speed, we observed that for
NEPs even small proportional gain may cause instability.
5. CONCLUSION
Nash equilibrium problems can be solved by an extremum
seeking algorithm if the agents belong to a certain class
of linear dynamics with strongly monotone and Lipschitz
continuous game mapping. Extension to general linear or
nonlinear systems and the extension to constrained states
and inputs, is left for future work.
Appendix A. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
To prove the theorem, it is necessary to show that our
subsystems, which under constant inputs stabilize to some
equilibrium points, will not become unstable when a time-
varying input is applied. Additionally, it is necessary that
our collective input u converges to the Nash equilibrium
u∗. First, we will describe the behaviour of the subsystems
to time-varying inputs.
Stability of equilibrium points pii(ui) for every agent i ∈ I
can be characterised by the following Lyapunov function:
Vi(xi, ui) =
β
2
(xi − pii(ui))>(xi − pii(ui)),
=
β
2
(xi −Biui)>(xi −Biui), (A.1)
where β > 0. The derivative of (A.1) is equal to
V˙i(xi, ui) = ∇xVi(xi, ui)>x˙i +∇uVi(xi, ui)>u˙i
= −β‖xi − pii(ui)‖2
− β(xi − pii(ui))>Bu˙i. (A.2)
Note that if ui is constant (u˙i = 0), equilibrium point
pii(ui) is uniformly globally exponentially stable (UGES).
For very slow changes of the input ui, we expect the
subsystems will converge to a small neighborhood of
equilibrium points pii(ui), while for fast changes of the
input ui, we do not. We consider the controller in (11).
Its goal is to both estimate the Nash equilibrium input u∗
and to preserve the stability of the subsystems. Therefore,
we construct the following Lyapunov function candidate:
W (x,u) := T (u) + V (x,u) =
1
2τmin
u˜>τ u˜+
N∑
i=1
Vi(xi, ui),
(A.3)
where u˜ = u− u∗ and τmin = min{τ1, . . . , τN}.
Now, we bound the derivative of T . By adding and
subtracting F (u) to (11), u˙ reads as
u˙ = −τ−1F (u)− τ−1(B>Fx(x)− F (u)). (A.4)
From (A.3) and (A.4), we have
T˙ (x,u) = − 1
τmin
u˜>F (u)− 1
τmin
u˜>(BFx(x)− F (u)).
(A.5)
Since F (u) is strongly monotone, it holds that
(F (u)− F (u∗))>(u− u∗) ≥ µ‖u− u∗‖2. (A.6)
As u∗ ∈ zer(F ), we have F (u∗) = 0, thus (A.6) reads as
F (u)>(u− u∗) = F (u)>u˜ ≥ µ‖u− u∗‖2. (A.7)
To bound the second term in (A.5), we use the following
identity:
∇uihi(pii(ui), pi−i(u−i))>
= ∇xihi(pii(ui), pi−i(u−i))>∇uipii(ui)
= ∇xihi(pii(ui), pi−i(u−i))>Bi. (A.8)
By using the relations (7), (9) and (A.8), it follows that:
B>Fx(pi(u)) = F (u). (A.9)
By exploiting (A.7) and (A.9), from (A.5) we have
T˙ ≤ − µ
τmin
‖u− u∗‖2
− 1
τmin
u˜>(B>Fx(x)−B>Fx(pi(u))). (A.10)
Since all of the functions are Lipschitz continuous, the
right-hand side in (A.10) can be upper bounded as follows:
T˙ ≤ − µ
τmin
‖u˜‖2 + L
τmin
‖u˜‖‖x− pi(u)‖, (A.11)
where L > 0 is the Lipschitz constant of the mapping
B> ◦ Fx.
Now, we turn our attention to the full Lyapunov function
candidate W . The derivative of W can be now bounded as
W˙ (x,u) ≤ −β‖x− pi(u)‖2 − µ
τmin
‖u˜‖2
+
L
τmin
‖u˜‖‖x− pi(u)‖ − β(x− pi(u))>Bu˙.
(A.12)
To complete the proof, we bound the derivative of V
caused by the change of inputs:
−β(x− pi(u))>Bu˙ ≤ β‖B‖‖u˙‖‖x− pi(u)‖. (A.13)
By using (A.4), the norm of the derivative is bounded:
‖u˙‖ ≤ 1
τmin
‖F (u)‖+ 1
τmin
‖(B>Fx(x)− F (u))‖. (A.14)
Again, since all of the functions are Lipschitz continu-
ous, the right-hand side of the previous equation can be
bounded as follows
‖u˙‖ ≤ LF
τmin
‖u˜‖+ L
τmin
‖x− pi(u)‖, (A.15)
where LF > 0 is the Lipschitz constant of F . By using the
bounds (A.13) and(A.15), W˙ can be bounded as follows:
W˙ (x,u) ≤ −
(
β − Lβ‖B‖
τmin
)
‖x− pi(u)‖2
+
L+ LFβ‖B‖
τmin
‖u˜‖‖x− pi(u)‖ − µ
τmin
‖u˜‖2
≤ −
[ ‖u˜‖
‖x− pi(u)‖
]>
M
[ ‖u˜‖
‖x− pi(u)‖
]
(A.16)
where
M =
 β − Lβ‖B‖τmin −L+ β‖B‖LF2τmin
−L+ β‖B‖LF
2τmin
µ
τmin
 . (A.17)
Thus, if
τmin ≥ (L+ β‖B‖LF )
2 + 4Lβ‖B‖
4βµ
, (A.18)
then the matrix M in (A.17) is positive definite, which in
turn implies that the Lyapunov derivative W˙ is negative
definite, which concludes the Lyapunov argument and in
turn the proof. 
Appendix B. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
The proof is similar to the full-information case proof,
but unlike the full-information case, our inputs use the
estimation of the θi variables, which affects stability. Let
us consider a Lyapunov function candidate of the form
L = W + V + T, (B.1)
where
W (η˜, θ˜) =
N∑
i=1
(
1
2
η˜>i η˜i +
1
2
θ˜>i Σiθ˜i
)
, (B.2)
V (x, uˆ) =
N∑
i=1
Vi(xi, uˆi), (B.3)
T (uˆ) =
1
2τmin
(uˆ− u∗)>τ (u− u∗) = 1
2τmin
u˜>τ u˜.
(B.4)
Therefore, our Lyapunov function candidate consists of:
(W) Parameter estimation scheme
(V) Local state-input Lyapnuov function
(T) Nash equilibrium estimation error
Parameter estimation scheme
We bound the time derivative of the W function similarly
to [Guay and Dochain [2017b]] and [Guay et al. [2018]]
with the only difference that we let each agent choose their
own parameters (σi,Ki, k
T
i ). The Lyapunov derivative
reads as follows:
W˙ (η˜, θ˜) ≤
p∑
i=1
(
− η˜>i
(
Ki − 1
2
− k1ζi
2
)
η˜i
+
1
2k1
θ˙>i θ˙i +
γ2i
2k2
θ˙>i θ˙i
kT ′i γ1i
2
θ˜τi θ˜i +
σi
2
θ>i θi
)
≤− ka‖η˜‖2 − kb‖θ˜‖2 + kc‖θ˙‖2 + σ
2
‖θ‖2, (B.5)
where ka := mini
(
Ki − 12 − k1ζi2
)
, kb := mini
(
kT ′i γ1i
2
)
,
kc := maxi
(
1
2k1
+ γ2i2k2
)
and σ := maxi σi.
Local state-input Lyapnuov function
As stated in the previous section ((A.1) and (A.2)),
equilibrium points pii(ui) are UGES when a constant input
is applied. Stability of equilibrium points pii(uˆi) for time-
varying inputs, for every agent i ∈ I can be characterised
by the following Lyapunov function:
Vi(xi, ui) =
β
2
(xi − pii(uˆi))>(xi − pii(uˆi))>, β > 0. (B.6)
The derivative of the Lyapunov function Vi(xi, ui) is
V˙i(xi, ui) =− β‖xi − pii(uˆi)‖2 + β(xi − pii(uˆi))>Bidi(t)
− β(xi − pii(uˆi))>B ˙ˆui. (B.7)
Note that the derivative has three addends; the first one is
equal to the complete derivative of the Lyapunov function
in the case of constant inputs, the amplitude of the
second component is proportional to the amplitude of the
perturbations and the amplitude of the third component
is equal to the amplitude of the derivative of the input ui.
To bound the third component, we need to bound ˙ˆui, hence
˙ˆu, which reads as
˙ˆu = −τ−1(θ1 + θ˜1)
= −τ−1(B>Fx(x) + θ˜1). (B.8)
By using the same argument as in (A.15), it follows that
˙ˆu ≤ LF
τmin
‖u˜‖+ L
τmin
‖x− pi(uˆ)‖+ 1
τmin
‖θ˜1‖. (B.9)
By using the previous equation, it is possible to bound the
second addend in (B.7):
β(x− pi(u))>B ˙ˆu ≤ LFβ‖B‖
τmin
‖u˜‖‖x− pi(uˆ)‖
+
Lβ‖B‖
τmin
‖x− pi(uˆ)‖2 + β‖B‖
τmin
‖θ˜1‖‖x− pi(uˆ)‖. (B.10)
Therefore, the derivative of V can be bounded as
V˙ (x,u) ≤ −β‖x− pi(uˆ)‖2 + LFβ‖B‖
τmin
‖u˜‖‖x− pi(uˆ)‖
+
Lβ‖B‖
τmin
‖x− pi(uˆ)‖2 + β‖B‖
τmin
‖θ˜1‖‖x− pi(uˆ)‖
− β(x− pi(uˆ))>Bd(t). (B.11)
The last term can be bounded by using Cauchy—
Bunyakovsky—Schwarz inequality to obtain
V˙ (x,u) ≤− β‖x− pi(uˆ)‖2 + LFβ‖B‖
τmin
‖u˜‖‖x− pi(uˆ)‖
+
Lβ‖B‖
τmin
‖x− pi(uˆ)‖2 + β‖B‖
τmin
‖θ˜1‖‖x− pi(uˆ)‖
+ β‖B‖‖x− pi(uˆ)‖‖d(t)‖. (B.12)
Finally, the last two non-quadratic terms can be bounded
with the inequality ‖x‖‖y‖ ≤ 12k‖x‖2 + k2‖y‖2 to finally
conclude the desired bound:
V˙ ≤−
(
β − Lβ‖B‖
τmin
− β‖B‖
2τmink3
− β‖B‖
2k4
)
‖x− pi(uˆ)‖2
+
LFβ‖B‖
τmin
‖u˜‖‖x− pi(uˆ)‖+ β‖B‖k3
2τmin
‖θ˜1‖2
+
β‖B‖k4
2
‖d(t)‖2. (B.13)
Nash equilibrium estimation error
The use of parameter estimation also has an influence on
the Nash equilibrium estimation error. The derivative of
(B.4) is equal to
T˙ (x, uˆ) = −τ−1u˜(B>Fx(x) + θ˜1i ). (B.14)
By the same method as in (A.11), (B.13), it follows that
T˙ (uˆ) ≤− µ
τmin
‖u˜‖2 + L
τmin
‖u˜‖‖x− pi(uˆ)‖+ 1
τmin
‖u˜‖‖θ˜1‖
≤ − µ
τmin
‖u˜‖2 + L
τmin
‖u˜‖‖x− pi(uˆ)‖+ 1
2τmink5
‖u˜‖2
+
k5
2τmin
‖θ˜1‖2. (B.15)
The full Lyapunov candidate
Now, with the bounds (B.5), (B.12) and (B.15), the
time derivative of the full Lyapunov candidate function
is bounded as follows:
L˙ ≤− ka‖η˜‖2 − kb‖θ˜0‖2 −
(
µ
τmin
− 1
2τmink5
)
‖u˜‖2
−
(
β − Lβ‖B‖
τmin
− β‖B‖
2τmink3
− β‖B‖
2k4
)
‖x− pi(uˆ)‖2
−
(
kb − k5
2τmin
− β‖B‖k3
2τmin
)
‖θ˜1‖2 + kc‖θ˙‖2 + σ
2
‖θ‖2
+
LFβ‖B‖+ L
τmin
‖u˜‖‖x− pi(uˆ)‖+ β‖B‖k4
2
‖d(t)‖2.
(B.16)
We are left with determining bounds on ‖θ‖ and ‖θ˙‖. Since
all of the considered functions (and their composition) in
(1a), (13), (14) and (22) are Lipschitz continuous, it follows
that
‖θ‖2 ≤ L1‖x− pi(uˆ)‖2 + L2‖u˜‖2 (B.17)
‖θ˙‖2 ≤ L3‖x− pi(uˆ)‖2 + L4‖u˜‖2, (B.18)
for some L1, L2, L3, L4 > 0. Substituting (B.17) and
(B.18) into (B.16), we obtain
L˙ ≤−
(
µ
τmin
− 1
2τmink5
− L2σ
2
− kcL4
)
‖u˜‖2 −
(
β − L1σ
2
− Lβ‖B‖
τmin
− β‖B‖
2τmink3
− β‖B‖
2k4
− kcL3
)
‖x− pi(uˆ)‖2
−
(
kb − k5
2τmin
− β‖B‖k3
2τmin
)
‖θ˜1‖2 − ka‖η˜‖2 − kb‖θ˜0‖2
+
LFβ‖B‖+ L
τmin
‖u˜‖‖x− pi(uˆ)‖+ β‖B‖k4
2
‖d(t)‖2.
(B.19)
The task at hand now is to prove that there exist pa-
rameters K, kT and τmin such that the right-hand side
in (B.19), apart from the term with ‖d(t)‖2, is always
negative definite. The proof goes by the same lines as in
[Guay and Dochain [2017b]], [Guay et al. [2018]].
Consider the following reformulation of (B.19):
L˙ ≤− ka‖η˜‖2 − kb‖θ˜0‖2 −
(
−L2σ
2
− kcL4
)
‖u˜‖2
−
(
−β‖B‖
2k4
− L1σ
2
− kcL3
)
‖x− pi(uˆ)‖2
−
(
kb − k5
2τmin
− β‖B‖k3
2τmin
)
‖θ˜1‖2 + β‖B‖k4
2
‖d(t)‖2
−
[ ‖u˜‖
‖x− pi(u)‖
]>
M
[ ‖u˜‖
‖x− pi(u)‖
]
, (B.20)
where
M =
 β − Lβ‖B‖τmin − β‖B‖2τmink3 −L+ β‖B‖LF2τmin
−L+ β‖B‖LF
2τmin
2µ− 1/k5
2τmin
 .
(B.21)
The parameter k3 can be chosen arbitrarily, while k5 has
to be chosen such that lower diagonal element in M is
positive, i.e. 2µ − 1/k5 > 0. Also, in order for M to be
positive definite, the following condition must be satisfied
v1(L, β‖B‖, LF , k3, k5, β, µ) =
(L+ β‖B‖LF )2 + 2Lβ‖B‖+ β‖B‖/k3
2β(2µ− 1/k5) ≤ τmin. (B.22)
From Equation (B.20), it can be also concluded that
τmin ≥ Lk3 + k5
kb
= v2(L, k3, k5, kb) (B.23)
Therefore, τmin ≥ max(v1, v2). Let λ be the smallest
eigenvalue of matrix M . The inequality (B.20) can be
reformulated as
L˙ ≤− ka‖η˜‖2 − kb‖θ˜0‖2 −
(
λ− L2σ
2
− kcL4
)
‖u˜‖2
−
(
λ− β‖B‖
2k4
− L1σ
2
− kcL3
)
‖x− pi(uˆ)‖2
−
(
kb − k5
2τmin
− β‖B‖k3
2τmin
)
‖θ˜1‖2 + β‖B‖k4
2
‖d(t)‖2.
(B.24)
The parameters σ, kc must be chosen small enough, while
k4 must be large enough such that the following equations
hold true:
0 < λ− L2σ
2
− kcL4,
0 < λ− β‖B‖
2k4
− L1σ
2
− kcL3. (B.25)
The parameter σ is a free design parameter; the parameter
kc can be made arbitrarily small by increasing the gains K
and kT (or to be more precise Ki and k
T
i , see [Guay and
Dochain [2017b]] for more details). The parameter k4 can
be arbitrarily chosen. Therefore, it is possible to choose
the controller parameters σ, kT and K such that all of the
constants that multiply the squares of the norms in (B.20)
(except for d(t)) are positive.
Next, we consider the Lyapunov functions of the subsys-
tems in (B.6), the bounds on matrices Σi and the quadratic
elements of the Lyapunov function candidate L. Let D
be the largest amplitude of all the perturbation signals
di(t). Then it can be concluded that there exists a positive
constant αL such that:
L˙ ≤ −αLL+ β‖B‖k4D
2
2
. (B.26)
With z =
(
η˜, θ˜,x, u˜
)
∈ RN × Rm+N × Rn × Rm, let us
define the set
Ωγ = {z | L(z) ≤ γ} . (B.27)
We choose γ such that
z ∈ Ωγ ⇒ θˆ ∈ Θ1 ×Θ2 × · · · ×ΘN . (B.28)
It then follows that the trajectories η˜, θ˜,x, u˜ enter the set
Ωγ0 =
{
z | L(z) ≤ β‖B‖k4D
2
2αL
}
. (B.29)
Therefore, for D chosen such that Ωγ0 ⊂ Ωγ , the set
Ωγ0 , which is contained in a ball containing the point
(0, 0,x∗, 0) with radius of order O (D2), is exponentially
stable for the closed-loop system . 
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